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The  recognition  of  self-face  is  a unique  and  complex  phenomenon  in  many  aspects,  including  its  associ-
ated  perceptual  integration  process,  its emergence  during  development,  and  its socio-motivational  effect.
This may  explain  the  failure  of  classical  attempts  to identify  the  cortical  areas  speciﬁcally  responsive  to
self-face  and  designate  them  as  a unique  system  related  to  ‘self’. Neuroimaging  ﬁndings  regarding  self-
face recognition  seem  to be explained  comprehensively  by a recent  forward-model  account  of  the  three
categories  of self:  the  physical,  interpersonal,  and  social  selves.  Self-face-speciﬁc  activation  in the  sensory
and motor  association  cortices  may  reﬂect  cognitive  scrutiny  due  to  prediction  error  or task-induced  top-
down attention  in  the  physical  internal  schema  related  to  the  self-face.  Self-face-speciﬁc  deactivation  in
some amodal  association  cortices  in  the  dorsomedial  frontal  and lateral  posterior  cortices  may  reﬂectevelopment
ocial
agnetic resonance imaging
adaptive  suppression  of  the  default  recruitment  of  the  social-response  system  during  face  recognition.
Self-face-speciﬁc  activation  under  a social  context  in  the  ventral  aspect  of the  medial  prefrontal  cortex
and  the  posterior  cingulate  cortex  may  reﬂect  cognitive  scrutiny  of  the  internal  schema  related  to  the
social  value  of the  self.  The  multi-facet  nature  of  self-face-speciﬁc  activation  may  hold  potential  as  the
basis  for  a multi-dimensional  diagnostic  tool for the cognitive  system.
© 2014  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-SA  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
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. Introduction
One’s self-face is important, unique, and special in many dif-
erent senses and contexts. The neural process underlying self-face
ecognition has interested researchers in different ﬁelds for various
easons. The diversity among researchers has resulted in variations
n opinions and approaches concerning neuroimaging studies on
elf-face recognition and in inconsistency in the interpretation of
esults.
In this review, I have attempted to demonstrate that the cogni-
ive or neural processes of self-face recognition can be understood
omprehensively by considering three different aspects of self-face
ecognition. Speciﬁcally, the processes are dissociated into three
omains, according to the conceptual framework of the three-layer
evelopmental model of self-related cognition (Sugiura, 2013). In
his work, I provide an overview of the different ﬁelds of psycho-
ogical and clinical research with interest in examining the process
f self-face recognition. I then review the neuroimaging ﬁndings
n self-face recognition with regard to how the three-layer frame-
ork addresses the multi-faceted and self-non-speciﬁc nature of
his complex concept. This ﬁnally leads to the idea that variation
n the activation of different brain regions during self-face recog-
ition may  reﬂect the different aspects of the cognitive system. I
ropose that activation during self-face recognition may  be used
s a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for cognition.
. Psychological and clinical background
.1. “This is not me”
Neuropsychologists or psychiatrists may  have particular inter-
st in the process of self-face recognition in the mirror, especially
n relation to the underlying perceptual integration process, which
ocuses on the interplay between bottom-up perceptual and top-
own supervisory processes. This interest is precipitated primarily
y the observation that some patients with dementia misidentify
heir self-image in the mirror (‘mirror sign’). These patients typ-
cally insist that their self-image in the mirror is not them but,
nstead, their friend, even though they usually retain face recog-
ition and mirror use (e.g., combing) abilities.
An inﬂuential account of this phenomenon suggests that there
re two routes in the bottom-up perceptual process and that these
re both controlled by a top-down supervisory process (Breen et al.,
001; Coltheart, 2010). One perceptual route is a common face-
ecognition process in which the visual features of the face in the
irror are matched with a ﬁgurative representation of the face
n the visual long-term memory. Another route involves detec-
ing temporal contingency between one’s bodily movements and
he visually perceived motion of the image in the mirror. It has
een assumed that each route may  produce false belief of “not
e”  because of occasional disturbance (i.e., the appearance and
otion of the face may  differ from the ﬁgurative representation and
he predicted movement, respectively), but that these perceptions
re immediately corrected by the top-down supervisory process,
hich integrates the information from both routes and contexts.
he mirror sign is considered to require coincidental perturbation
f one perceptual route and supervisory process, with the result
hat the false belief generated by the damaged perceptual route is
ot corrected (Breen et al., 2001; Coltheart, 2010).
.2. The development of self-recognition by human infants and
ther animals
Animal and developmental psychologists are interested in when
nd how visual self-recognition emerges during development. Thisearch 90 (2015) 56–64 57
ability appears to rely on a process that overrides the common face-
recognition process.
In animals, self-recognition ability is seen only in a small number
of highly ‘intelligent’ species. In human infants, it becomes evident
at a relatively advanced developmental stage. Therefore, this abil-
ity is considered a hallmark of a higher level of social-cognitive
development that only humans and a few other animal species can
achieve (Gallup, 1982; Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009).
It seems that the emergence of self-recognition ability involves
the inhibition of common social responses toward conspeciﬁcs.
When tested for this ability, animals generally respond to the self-
image in the mirror as if they were being confronted by another
animal. Only a few of the examined species stopped displaying
this social behavior and started to show behavior indicative of
an understanding of the self-image in the mirror (Gallup, 1982;
Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009). A special technique called
the “mark test” has been introduced for objective measurements
of self-recognition by these animals (Gallup, 1970). In this test, a
mark is placed on a conspicuous part of the body that is not directly
observable by the animal (often near the face) without the animal
knowing, and then the animal is placed in front of a mirror. When
animals cease mirror-directed behavior and initiate mark-directed
behavior, such as touching the mark directly, they are considered
capable of recognizing themselves in the mirror.
Two  lines of relevant ﬁndings have encouraged researchers
to consider this ability an indication of a special level of social-
cognitive development that allows for conceptualization of ‘self’
and ‘other’. First, animals that show evidence of visual self-
recognition also show the ability to infer the mental state, such
as belief and feeling, of another. Second, these animals have large
brains relative to their body weight (Gallup, 1982; Plotnik et al.,
2006; Prior et al., 2008; Reiss and Marino, 2001). It is, therefore,
attractive to assume that a special neural system has evolved in the
developed brain to represent the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘other’, and
that this is required for both visual self-recognition and inference
of the mental state of others. In human infants, self-recognition
in the mirror emerges during the second year of their life, coinci-
dent with the inhibition of common social responses toward other
babies (Amsterdam, 1972). This emergence also coincides with that
of empathic behavior (Bischof-Köhler, 1988; Zahn-Waxler et al.,
1992).
2.3. Social aspects of the self-face
Social psychologists are interested in how the perceived appear-
ance of one’s own face from the perspective of others affects
self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior. This interest is
also shared by some clinical professionals, such as orthodontics and
facial plastic/reconstructive surgeons, as well as psychotherapists
or psychiatrists working with patients with self-image disorders.
This ﬁeld of research is related to the cognitive processes associated
with processing social values.
One is more or less aware that the self is a social object that has
an effect on others. Public self-consciousness is a commonly used
measure of the extent of this awareness (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
The face, with respect to its perceived attractiveness and expressive
ability, has a particularly strong impact on these social effects.
A person’s facial attractiveness affects how they are evaluated
and treated by observers. Evolutionary theories posit that facial
attractiveness is an honest indicator of ﬁtness, health, quality, and
reproductive value. People with attractive faces tend to receive
higher evaluations about their abilities (Clifford and Walster, 1973;
Landy and Sigall, 1974) and have higher incomes, owing to priv-
ileged hiring or promotions (Frieze et al., 1991; Marlowe et al.,
1996). The divergent evaluation and treatment of attractive and
unattractive targets correlate with differential behaviors and traits.
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Fig. 1. Self-face-speciﬁc activation. The locations of the peak voxels are plotted in the y–z plane of the MNI  coordinate system on the lateral surface of the left (left panel) and
right  (right panel) hemispheres. The eleven contrasts from nine studies are indicated using different symbols. Contrasts were limited to those comparing the event-related
response to the self-face with that to the face of a familiar person (e.g., a friend, colleague), or a regression analysis of the response according to the degree of ‘selfness’ in the
morphed face of the self and the familiar person. All the included studies used an uncorrected p < 0.001 or a more stringent threshold in voxel-level analysis and reported
the  results in the MNI  coordinate system. The peaks 20 mm or more in distance leftward (x ≤ −20) and rightward (x ≥ 20) from the midsagittal plane are plotted on the left
and  right hemispheres, respectively. One peak less than 20 mm in distance (Platek et al., 2006) was not included. The anatomical image represents a standard single-subject
anatomical image from SPM8. Two  contrasts were included when two  contexts existed: one study (Oikawa et al., 2012) manipulated the impression of the self-face to make
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tt  more attractive [a] or unattractive [b], and the other (Sugiura et al., 2012) include
ompared with unattractive adults, attractive adults are more
xtroverted and possess more traditional attitudes, higher self-
steem, and better social skills (Langlois et al., 2000). Improving
acial appearance via surgical treatment of maxillofacial deformi-
ies or esthetic disorders has been shown to affect the self-esteem
nd mood of patients (Alves et al., 2005; Motegi et al., 2003).
atients who have behavioral problems or psychotic symptoms
ere exposed to pictures of their faces with the purpose of
mproving their self-image, and some therapeutic effects have been
eported (Fryrear, 1983).
Facial movement is an important component of expressive
ehavior. The Self-Monitoring Inventory is an index of the aware-
ess of and the self-evaluation skills related to expressive behavior.
hose who self-evaluate highly may  be especially responsive to
ocial and interpersonal cues of situationally appropriate behavior.
onversely, low self-evaluation is thought to reﬂect inner attitudes,
motions, and dispositions (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000). In fact,
igh self-evaluators are good at leaving favorable impressions on
thers and are accurate in predicting these impressions (Tobey and
unnell, 1981).
. Neuroimaging ﬁndings concerning self-face recognition
.1. In search of ‘self’
Functional brain mapping studies of self-face recognition have
een primarily driven by the motivation to identify a unique neu-
al system responsible for the conceptualization of ‘self’, which is
 characteristic of only a limited number of animal species with
uman-like intelligence. This concept may  have arisen partially
rom ﬁndings concerning mirrored-self recognition in animal and
evelopmental psychology.
Pioneered by three works published in 2000 (Keenan et al., 2000;
ircher et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2000), more than a dozen stud-
es (Apps et al., 2012, 2013; Devue et al., 2007; Kaplan et al., 2008;
orita et al., 2008; Oikawa et al., 2012; Platek et al., 2004, 2006;
ugiura et al., 2005, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014; Taylor et al., 2009;
ddin et al., 2005) have so far reported a unique pattern of brain
ctivation during self-face recognition that contrasts with the pat-
ern observed during the perception of other people’s faces (both
amiliar and unfamiliar). In early studies, which typically employed
 small number of subjects and a liberal statistical threshold,
he reported identity of the activated regions varied considerablyall [c] or large [d] number of distracter unfamiliar faces in other trials in a block.
across studies (see Devue and Bredart, 2011; Platek et al., 2008; van
Veluw and Chance, 2014 for review). In recent studies, however, the
activated regions appear to mostly localize within a speciﬁc area in
the lateral cortex of the right hemisphere (Fig. 1).
These results are disappointing with respect to the quest for
a unique system responsible for the concept of self. First, the
identiﬁed activation clusters are largely in sensory or motor asso-
ciation cortices, which are unlikely to be responsible for a ‘special’
level of social-cognitive development. One reasonably would have
expected multimodal association cortices, the evolutionary devel-
opment of which is evident in only a few ‘intelligent’ animal species.
Second, more critically, these results are largely inconsistent with
the ﬁndings for other types of self-cognition. For example, activa-
tion during the perception of the self-directed eye-gaze of others
has been reported primarily in the bilateral temporal and medial
prefrontal cortices (Senju and Johnson, 2009). Similarly, during self-
reﬂection (e.g., trait judgment), activation is reported in the medial
frontal, parietal, and cingulate cortices (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley
et al., 2002).
Furthermore, recent studies have presented self-face-speciﬁc
ﬁndings that do not conform conceptually to the unique-system
notion. First, self-speciﬁc deactivation, rather than activation, has
been postulated for the characteristics of activity changes during
self-face recognition. Several neuroimaging studies have reported
deactivation during the recognition of the self-face, relative to that
of other (familiar and unfamiliar) faces, in the bilateral temporo-
parietal junction (Fig. 2), anterior temporal cortex, and medial
prefrontal cortex (Devue et al., 2007; Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura
et al., 2005, 2008, 2012; Uddin et al., 2005). In the unique system
theory, it is not explained why  deactivation of a speciﬁc neu-
ral system is necessary for self-concept. Second, context-speciﬁc
self-face-speciﬁc activation has been reported (Fig. 3). One study
identiﬁed such activation in the ventromedial prefrontal and pos-
terior cingulate cortices when the face presentation series included
a large proportion of unfamiliar faces as distractors (Sugiura et al.,
2012). Another study, using young female subjects (Oikawa et al.,
2012), manipulated the perceived attractiveness of the presented
‘self’ and ‘other’ faces to exploit the contrast effect (Cash et al.,
1983); the self-face looked relatively attractive among the series
of unattractive distractor faces. Self-face-speciﬁc activation in the
posterior cingulate cortex and ventral tegmental area, components
of the reward system, is enhanced by manipulation to make more
attractive, but not by manipulation to make less attractive. This
M. Sugiura / Neuroscience Research 90 (2015) 56–64 59
Fig. 2. Self-speciﬁc deactivation. Two examples of lower event-related responses during self-face recognition, compared to viewing an unfamiliar face. (a) Deactivation
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he  left (left panel) and right (right panel) temporoparietal junctions (adopted from
bserved context-dependent activation, which is separate from
he common self-face-speciﬁc activation, is also unlikely to be
xplained fully by a simple notion of a unique system.
.2. The three-layer framework of self-cognition
Abandoning the notion of a unique system for the concept of
elf, recent neuroscientiﬁc accounts of self-cognition assume mul-
iple categories of self, each of which is supported by a distinct
ortical network involved in self-nonspeciﬁc processes (Farmer and
sakiris, 2012; Gillihan and Farah, 2005; Northoff et al., 2006; Uddin
t al., 2007). A recent comprehensive model proposed three cate-
ories; namely, the physical self, interpersonal self, and social self
Sugiura, 2011, 2013).In this model, the processes of self-face recognition that are
ddressed classically are categorized primarily into the concept of
he physical self. The physical self also includes the other domains
f bodily self-recognition, the sense of body ownership, and that
ig. 3. Context-dependent self-face-speciﬁc activation. Two  examples are presented for 
y  a large number of distracter unfamiliar faces in other trials in a block was  identiﬁed in t
t  al., 2012). (b) Enhancement when the self-face appeared attractive was  observed in the
012).ed in the left (left panel) and right (right panel) temporoparietal junctions (adopted
espectively of the social context (i.e., the number of distracter unfamiliar faces) in
ra et al., 2012).
of action self-agency. The processing of the physical self primarily
involves sensory and motor association cortices located in the right
hemisphere (Fig. 4a). Speciﬁcally, the involved sensory association
cortices are related to the sensory modalities relevant to the stim-
ulus or representation: vision (i.e., ventral and dorsal pathways),
somatic sensation, and sometimes interoception (i.e., insula) in the
case of the visual self-face recognition. The motor association cor-
tices include, laterally, premotor areas (i.e., both dorsal and ventral)
and, medially, supplementary and cingulate motor areas.
The second category, the interpersonal self, is assumed to rep-
resent the attention or intentions of others directed at the self,
exempliﬁed by the process activated during the perception of the
self-directed eye-gaze of others. This category of self is considered
to be supported by several amodal association cortices in the dorso-
medial frontal and lateral posterior cortices (Fig. 4b), which overlap
with the cortical network involved with the inference of the men-
tal state of others (i.e., theory of mind or mentalizing) (Senju and
Johnson, 2009).
self-face-speciﬁc enhancement of activation by a social context. (a) Enhancement
he ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices (adopted from Sugiura
 posterior cingulate cortex and ventral tegmental area (adopted from Oikawa et al.,
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Fig. 4. The three-layer model of self-related cognition. Three categories of self share the computational characteristics of the forward-model, which is underpinned by the
internal schema or learned associations between one’s behavioral output and the consequential input. Three schemata exist within a hierarchical layer structure, based on
developmental processes. (a) The physical self, including the self-face recognition, is represented by the sensorimotor schema, supported by the sensory and motor association
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aortices, primarily in the right hemisphere. (b) The interpersonal self is represente
orsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices. (c) The social self is represented
ingulate cortices.
The third category, the social self, has been postulated to be a
ollection of context-dependent social-values. As shown in neu-
oimaging studies related to self-reﬂection (Craik et al., 1999;
elley et al., 2002), the social self seems to be supported by the
entral aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior
ingulate cortex (Fig. 4c), areas also known to process value-based
ecision making (Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth et al., 2011) and
pisodic memory retrieval (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Wagner
t al., 2005), respectively.
This model adopts the explanation of the self as a phenom-
nal aspect of contingency detection, which is a rather classical
otion (David et al., 2008; Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Wegner and
heatley, 1999) and has been formalized within the framework
f the forward-model (Frith et al., 2000). In the case of self-face
ecognition in the mirror, forward prediction is a key process
or detecting temporal contingency between one’s facial or head
ovement and the visually perceived motion of the image in the
irror. We  implicitly predict how the image moves using the
nternal sensorimotor schema, which is the association between
ne’s motor output (motor plan) and the consequential perceptual
nput (sensory feedback), learned through repeated experiences.
he discrepancy between the prediction and the actual input (i.e.,
rediction error) induces the sense of ‘otherness’ and triggers neu-
al processing for the perceptual or contextual scrutiny for the
ause of the discrepancy. Activation of the sensory or motor asso-
iation cortex relevant to the physical self is explained in terms of
his scrutiny, owing to prediction error or task-induced top-down
ttention to the internal (sensorimotor) schema.he interpersonal schema, supported by several amodal association cortices in the
 social-value schema, supported by the ventromedial prefrontal and the posterior
The model assumes that our interpersonal and social selves also
share these forward-model computational characteristics, despite
differences in the underlying cognitive processes and neural sub-
strates. The interpersonal self is the phenomenal aspect of the
functioning of an interpersonal schema that represents an asso-
ciation between one’s social action and the expected responses of
others. The social self is relevant to the social-value schema that
represents a link between one’s social behavior and the predicted
evaluation of this behavior.
Furthermore, these three categories of self, or internal schemata,
are assumed to comprise a hierarchical layered structure in the
order of the physical, interpersonal, and social selves. The matura-
tion of one layer, or schema, serves as the basis for the development
of the next layer (Fig. 4).
3.3. Self-face recognition in the three-layer framework
This forward-model account of self-cognition in the three-layer
framework seems to provide an explanation for classical self-
face-speciﬁc activation that is an alternative to the unique-system
notion. It also explains self-face-speciﬁc deactivation and context-
dependent self-face-speciﬁc activation.
3.3.1. Physical aspects
According to the forward-model account, activation of the sen-
sory and motor association cortices during self-face recognition
may reﬂect cognitive scrutiny due to prediction error or task-
induced top-down attention to the internal schema. Careful review
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f the relevant studies provides further insight. The studies that
eported prominent self-face-speciﬁc activation typically used face
timuli in non-canonical views, such as from non-frontal views
Oikawa et al., 2012; Sugiura et al., 2005, 2006, 2008), with expres-
ion (Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2006, 2008), in motion
Sugiura et al., 2006, 2014), and of childhood (Apps et al., 2012).
ctivation has been implicated in the process of updating the self-
ace representation based on synchronized visual and tactile inputs
n front of the mirror (Apps et al., 2013). When looking at our own
ace in the mirror, we usually spend a vast majority of time observ-
ng its frontal view, without expression or motion. It is likely that
he visual representation of our own face in the long-term memory
s in this canonical view, and the recognition in other views may
equire cognitive scrutiny to transform the non-canonical view to
 canonical view.
In addition, activation in different sensory association cortices
ay  reﬂect transformation of different aspects of non-canonicity.
 recent study on mirrored self-face recognition compared acti-
ation between static and dynamic presentations (Sugiura et al.,
014). Activation for the static self-face was observed in the right
nferior temporal, supramarginal and inferior frontal gyri; these
egions may  be relevant to the transformation of static features
f the self-face required to compensate for the atypical presen-
ation of the face caused by the experimental settings. When the
elf-face was presented with mouth motion, however, activation of
everal other regions, including the bilateral superior parietal lob-
les and the intraparietal sulci was also observed. This is suggestive
f roles for these regions in the cognitive processing of dynamic
eatures, which are rarely included in the representation of the
elf-face. Consistent with this segregation, patients with lesions
n the latter regions have been reported to show impairments in
elf-recognition of a body part, but not a face part (Frassinetti et al.,
012); it is likely that the representation of the self-body is more
elevant to dynamic features than to static features.
.3.2. Interpersonal aspects
Self-face-speciﬁc deactivation may  reﬂect a facet of self-face
ecognition that belongs to the interpersonal layer of the three-
ayer framework. The signiﬁcance of self-face-speciﬁc deactivation
n self-face recognition may  be conceived based on the observa-
ion that self-face recognition emerges following the suppression
f other directed responses to a mirror image. The deactivated
egions, such as the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, anterior
emporal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (Devue et al., 2007;
orita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2005, 2008; Uddin et al., 2005),
verlap with regions implicated in the perception of the self-
irected eye-gaze of others (Senju and Johnson, 2009), as well as in
he inference of the mental state of others (Frith and Frith, 2006;
allagher and Frith, 2003). The model assumes that these regions
nderpin the interpersonal self or the learned association between
ne’s social actions (i.e., output) and the social response of others
i.e., consequential perceptual input) (Sugiura, 2013). Processing
he attention or intentions of others directed at the self is critical
hen confronted with any face other than the self-face. For the self-
ace, the recruitment of such social processes may  be inefﬁcient,
iven the limited computational resources of the brain. Considering
he fact that the face-recognition system recruits social processes
utomatically, this deactivation is likely to reﬂect the functioning of
op-down suppression as an adoptive energy-saving mechanism.
It is attractive to assume that this neural suppression underlies
he behavioral change of the animals in front of the mirror at the
mergence of mirrored-self recognition. This consideration leads
ur interest to the controller of this suppressive process. While
peculative, a likely candidate is the right lateral prefrontal cor-
ex. This region has been reported to show increased activation
or self-face relative to other faces, and it is involved in cognitiveearch 90 (2015) 56–64 61
control, including selection and suppression of cognitive processes
(Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Sugiura et al., 2007). In an account
of the mirror sign (Coltheart, 2010), failure in the correction of
the false belief of “not me”  generated in a perceptual route was
attributed to the dysfunction of this region. The role of the pre-
frontal cortex in self-face recognition, however, is largely a future
issue. A recent neuroimaging study on mirrored-self recognition
demonstrated functional segregation of the right prefrontal cortex:
some regions commonly are responsive to different self-relevant
cues (i.e., perceptual routes), while other regions are responsive to
conﬂict between those cues (Sugiura et al., 2014).
3.3.3. Social aspects
Context-induced self-face-speciﬁc activation observed previ-
ously in the ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate
cortices appears relevant to processes in the social-value layer
in the three-layer framework. Such activation, elicited when dis-
tractors included a large proportion of unfamiliar faces (Sugiura
et al., 2012), may  be explained by enhancement of the social-
value processing of the self-face, owing to the existence of a large
amount of references (i.e., distractor faces), as suggested by the
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954). Self-speciﬁc activa-
tion observed in the posterior cingulate cortex when the self-face
appeared attractive (Oikawa et al., 2012) can be explained in a sim-
ilar manner. Activation of the reward system in the latter study
appears to reﬂect an incentive value related to the attractiveness
of the self-face.
These ﬁndings thus suggest that the awareness of oneself as
a social object or the awareness of social value depends on the
context in which one sees the self-face. The existence of social ref-
erences may  trigger cognitive processing of the internal schema of
social value of the self, and the reward system may also be recruited,
reﬂecting the motivational value of the situation (i.e., the self-face
in the context).
Context-dependent modulation of self-face-induced activation
does not always occur in the social-value layer; such a modulation
appears to be associated only with the context in which references
relevant to the social value of the self exist. Other contexts may
modulate activation during self-face recognition in different layers.
Under the context in which the self-face was presented in non-
photogenic pictures and the face-viewing task was  observed by
another person (Morita et al., 2014), activation was enhanced in the
right anterior insula (interoceptive association cortex) and caudal
anterior cingulate cortex (arguably, a motor-associated component
of the cingulate cortex), that is, in the sensorimotor layer.
4. Individual differences in activation during self-face
recognition
4.1. Potential for a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool
Given the multi-faceted nature of self-face-speciﬁc activation
and the self-non-speciﬁc primary roles of the involved mecha-
nisms reviewed thus far, it appears reasonable to expect individual
differences in self-face-speciﬁc activation to reﬂect the individual
characteristics of a wide range of self-non-speciﬁc cognitive
domains. In the three-layer framework, activation of the neural
substrates for the physical, interpersonal, and social schemata may
reﬂect the individual characteristics of the perceptual, supervisory,
and motivational processes, respectively. Neural characteristics of
the perceptual and integration systems, particularly those related
to the processing of prediction error, may  be associated with
the individual characteristics related to understanding common
environmental situations in daily life, in addition to recogni-
tion of the self-face. Individual differences in the functioning of
6 ce Res
t
o
t
n
v
o
a
s
r
t
p
p
w
c
a
4
d
a
s
u
o
a
r
e
h
a
u
2
i
a
i
m
w
d
c
a
a
d
2
f
a
i
2
4
d
c
t
e
s
a
t
p
f
d
c2 M. Sugiura / Neuroscien
he supervisory inhibitory mechanism regulating inappropriate
r unnecessary social-cognitive processes (i.e., suppression of
he interpersonal schema) may  exist also during daily social or
on-social situations other than self-face recognition. Individual
ariance of the processing of social values and responsiveness
f the reward or motivational system affects not only neural
ctivity during self-face recognition but also self-awareness,
elf-evaluation, and social behavior in a daily social context.
Therefore, individual differences in activation during self-face
ecognition may  be used as a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for
he characteristics of an individual’s cognitive system, including
ersonality traits and mental disorders. It has been demonstrated
reviously that at least three components of cross-subject variation
ere included in activation during self-face recognition, and each
omponent was related to different types of self-stimulus and was
ssociated with a different cortical region (Sugiura et al., 2006).
.2. Existing ﬁndings
Neuroimaging research on individual differences in activation
uring self-face recognition is in its infancy. Explored system char-
cteristics are thus far limited to a few dimensions related to
elf-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior.
For normal subjects, two personality traits have been addressed
sing a region-of-interest approach and a liberal statistical thresh-
ld. A high public self-consciousness score is associated with
ctivation during self-face recognition in the right inferior frontal
egions, with the examined loci differing between two  studies (Kita
t al., 2011; Morita et al., 2008). In one study, high self-esteem
as been associated with activation during the recognition of an
ttractive self-face in the posterior cingulate cortex and that of an
nattractive self-face in the ventral tegmental area (Oikawa et al.,
012).
The effects of some relevant mental disorders have also been
nvestigated, but the ﬁndings are sporadic. Three studies have
ddressed autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and reported ﬁndings
nconsistent among one another; an early study reported abnor-
al  activation during the recognition of unfamiliar faces, compared
ith the self-face (Uddin et al., 2008), and recent studies reported
ecreased activation in the right inferior frontal region in autistic
hildren (Kita et al., 2011) or in the posterior cingulate cortex in
utistic adults (Morita et al., 2012). Two studies used self-image
s a means to induce anxiety in patients with social anxiety disor-
er (Pujol et al., 2013) or body dysmorphic disorder (Bohon et al.,
012) and were able to detect anxiety-related activation. One study
eatured a small number of schizophrenic patients and reported an
bnormality in connectivity across several brain regions, while fail-
ng to detect it in a conventional subtraction analysis (Yun et al.,
014).
.3. Future research perspectives
In order to develop this line of research in the context of a multi-
imensional diagnostic tool for the individual cognitive system, I
onsider the following three directions particularly promising from
he perspective of the three-layer model.
First, for individual differences in social self-awareness, self-
valuation, or behavior, research should not focus on the classical
elf-face-responsive areas. Such characteristics are unlikely to be
ttributed to the physical self in the sensory-motor layer. Instead,
he areas implicated in social-context-dependent activation appear
romising, given their relevance to the social-value layer. In
act, the relationship between self-esteem and attractiveness-
ependent activation for the self-face in the posterior cingulate
ortex and ventral tegmental area (Oikawa et al., 2012), as well asearch 90 (2015) 56–64
that between the ASD and lower activation of the posterior cingu-
late cortex (Morita et al., 2012), are congruent with this prediction.
Second, in this vein, individual differences in the degree of
self-face speciﬁc deactivation (i.e., interpersonal layer) are also
interesting. This divergence may  be related to social characteristics
that convey both adaptive and non-adaptive nuances; for example,
a lower degree of deactivation may  reﬂect the immaturity in form-
ing self-other distinctions, or the tendency to monitor the social
appearance of the self-face objectively.
Finally, individual differences in activation of the classical self-
face-responsive areas are likely to be associated with cognitive
processing of prediction error. Here the characteristics may be
relevant to the prediction error related to the self-face, to other
self-related perceptions, or to self-nonspeciﬁc environmental
input. A low degree of neural response to the non-canonicity of
the presented self-face may  parallel the efﬁcacy in suppressing
or ignoring the prediction error that is irrelevant to the task or
context. Such behavioral characteristics appear adaptive in most
of the daily scenes.
5. Conclusion
Classical brain mapping studies of self-face recognition have
sought primarily to identify a unique neural system underlying the
concept of ‘self’, as an engram of human-like intelligence. The ﬁnd-
ings are, however, inconsistent with this notion; activation char-
acteristics for the self-face have multiple aspects, and the involved
neural mechanisms are not self-speciﬁc. The ﬁndings seem to be
explained comprehensively by a forward-model account of the
three categories of self: the physical self, interpersonal self, and
social self. The model explains the self as a phenomenal aspect of the
functioning of the internal schema, the learned association between
one’s behavioral output and the consequential perceptual input.
The sensory and motor association cortices activated during
self-face recognition seem to be the sensorimotor schema, which is
the association between one’s motor output and the consequential
perceptual input. The observed activation of the schema may  reﬂect
cognitive scrutiny caused by prediction error or task-induced top-
down attention. Activation in different sensory association cortices
may  reﬂect transformation of the different aspects of sensory input
to match the canonical representation. Several amodal association
cortices in the dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices
are deactivated speciﬁcally during the recognition of the self-face.
These regions may  correspond to the interpersonal schema, the
association between one’s social action and the expected responses
of others. Deactivation may  reﬂect adaptive suppression of the
default recruitment of the social-response system during face
recognition. The ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex and
the posterior cingulate cortex were speciﬁcally activated for the
self-face only in the context where references relevant to the self-
face existed. These areas may  represent the social value schema,
which is the link between one’s social behavior and the predicted
evaluation of this behavior. The existence of a social reference may
trigger cognitive processing of the internal schema of social value
of the self.
Given the multi-faceted nature of self-face-speciﬁc activation
and the self-non-speciﬁc roles of the involved mechanisms, indi-
vidual differences in self-face-speciﬁc activation may  reﬂect the
individual characteristics of a wide range of cognitive domains.
Such data may  be used as a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for
the characteristics of an individual’s cognitive system, including
personality traits and mental disorders. Neuroimaging research
in this line has just begun; explored system characteristics are
limited thus far to a few dimensions related to self-awareness,
self-evaluation, and social behavior. Future research should focus
on the search for individual characteristics outside of the classical
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elf-face-responsive areas. Self-face speciﬁc deactivation is likely
o be an interesting area of research. Finally, classical self-face-
esponsive areas are likely to be associated with the areas of the
ognitive system responsible for the processing of prediction error.
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